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CYNTHIA A. MARLETTE

FERC Open Access Transmission

Rule and Utility Bypass Cases*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that today's electricity customers, both wholesale
and retail, are actively searching for ways to shop for cheaper electric
energy. Beginning with the Energy Policy Act of 1992 [hereinafter EPAct], 1
and spurred by recent activities of Federal and state regulators to promote
competitive power markets, the possibilities and incentives have never been
greater for customers. The big debate for public policy makers and electric
industry participants is how far and how fast the transition to competition
should take, and who will pay the cost of the transition.
On April 24, 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[hereinafter Commission] issued final rules establishing the basic
framework for opening up competition in wholesale electricity markets. The
Commission also issued rules of the road for determining who bears the
sunk costs that could become stranded as customers shop for cheaper
suppliers. Commission Order 888 addresses open access transmission and
stranded cost recovery.2 Order 889 carries out the details of Order 888's
requirements that an electronic transmission information system and a code
of conduct separating transmission operations personnel from generation
marketing personnel be established. The Commission also simultaneously
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on new and improved open access
transmission tariffs.4 This paper highlights the key elements of the rules,
focuses on those elements and issues that are particularly relevant to utility
bypass and discusses recent Commission cases addressing utility bypass.

Adaptation of remarks given at the University of New Mexico School of Law
Symposium on Electric Industry Bypass Policy.
1. Pub. L. No. 102486,106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
2. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888,61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996), III FERC Stats.
& Regs. 1 31,036 (1996)(Order 888), orderon rehearing,78 FERC 61,220 (Mar. 4,1997).
3. Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information
Networks) and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889,61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (May 10, 1996),
FERC Stats. & Regs. 31,035 (1996) (Order 889), order on rehearing, 78 FERC [ 61,221 (Mar. 4,
1997).
4. Capacity Reservation Open Access Transmission Tariffs, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,847 (May 10,1996).
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H. ORDERS 888 AND 889 NON-DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS
The legal foundation of Order 888 is to remedy undue
discrimination in interstate transmission services. The rule requires all
public utilities that own, control or operate interstate transmission facilities
to offer comparable, non-discriminatory transmission services, including
ancillary services, to participants in wholesale electricity markets.
The Commission ordered access pursuant to its authority over public
utilities under sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act [hereinafter
FPA],5 not its authority to order case-by-case transmission under recently
amended sections 211 and 212 of the FPA.6 This means that the open access
requirement does not directly apply to non-public utilities such as
municipalities, most cooperatives, and federal power marketing agencies.
However, as discussed below, these non-public utilities do have an indirect
incentive under the rule to offer comparable transmission services over their
systems.
Under the non-discriminatory access or comparability requirement,
public utilities must offer any transmission service that they are reasonably
capable of providing, whether or not the particular type of service is
currently being provided to the utility itself or to others. Order 888 makes
the process simple. The Order contains a generally applicable pro forma
tariff that offers both point-to-point and network transmission services. The
tariff contains the minimum terms and conditions of non-discriminatory
access. All of the existing 166 public utilities were required to file this tariff
on or before July 9,1996, or make a good faith request for waiver.
Certain provisions of the proforma tariff permit variations reflecting
regional practices. However, no other deviations were allowed in the July
9 filings. The Commission's goal was to get good access in place as quickly
as possible. The Commission allowed utilities to argue for changes in or
additions to the Order 888 proformatariff's terms and conditions, but only
after the utilities had first filed the proforma tariff. The Commission did not,
however, dictate the transmission rates to be filed with the proforma tariffs.

5. Sections 205 and 206,16 U.S.C. "824 d and 824e (1994), apply to public utilities, i.e.,
persons other than Federal, State or local government entities that own or operate facilities
used for transmission in interstate commerce or for sales for resale in interstate commerce.
6. Sections 211 and 212, 16 U.S.C. § 824(j) and 824(k) (1994), which permit the
Commission to order transmission services on a case-by-case basis if certain criteria are met,
apply to transmitting utilities, i.e., persons that sell electric energy, qualifying cogeneration

and small power facilities, and Federal power marketing agencies that own or operate
electric power transmission facilities used for the sale of electric energy at wholesale; thus,
they may apply to municipalities and public power entities, and apply to intrastate as well
as interstate transmission facilities.
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The Commission permitted utilities to file whatever rate they wished, so
long as it was consistent with the Commission's transmission pricing policy
statement. All but one of the 166 public utilities made some type of
compliance filing, either a tariff or a request for waiver from some or all of
the rule. In addition, 28 non-public utilities submitted either reciprocity
transmission tariffs or waiver requests.
While the proforma tariffs contain a number of important terms and
conditions, two provisions are of particular importance for customers that
may want to leave their current electric supplier's system: eligibility and
reciprocity. These provisions affect who can get service and what they may
have to offer in exchange for obtaining it.
The eligibility provision is critical to buyers and sellers of electric
energy who need to use an open access tariff to reach one another. Any
person that would be eligible to seek a section 211 transmission order under
the FPA is an eligible customer under the open access tariffs. This includes
any electric utility and any federal power marketing agency. Order 888
clarifies that any electric utility (any person who sells electric energy),
includes: municipalities, electric power cooperatives, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, independent power producers, affiliated power producers,
qualifying facilities (QFs) under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978 (PURPA),7 and traditional investor-owned utilities. It also includes
marketers but does not include brokers. This is because brokers do not take
title to energy and thus do not sell electric energy. The rule further clarifies
that any entity engaged in wholesale purchases or sales of electric energy
can seek service, not just those that generate electric energy. The
transmission provider itself is also an eligible customer under its own tariff.
Any foreign entity that otherwise meets the eligibility criteria may
seek service under the open access tariffs. Order 888 makes clear, however,
that this eligibility requirement is not tied to any determination that foreign
entities would be eligible for service under section 211. Instead, the
requirement is imposed under section 206 of the FPA to remedy undue
discrimination and ensure that domestic customers have access to as many
suppliers as possible.
Even if an entity falls into one of the above eligibility categories,
however, there may be another hurdle to overcome. There is a proviso in
the eligibility provision of the open access tariffs that such entities are not
eligible for transmission service that would be prohibited by section 212(h)
of the FPA,8 unless the service is provided voluntarily or pursuant to a state
requirement. This section contains the "sham" wholesale, or anti-bypass

7.
8.

Pub. L. No. 95-617,92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
16 U.S.C. § 824k(h) (1994).
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provision of the statute. It precludes the Commission from ordering
wholesale wheeling under any provision of the FPA if it would result in
access that is, in effect, unauthorized retail bypass.
Retail customers are eligible for service under the wholesale open
access tariff in two situations: 1) where a utility voluntarily offers
unbundled retail transmission service, and 2) where a utility offers
unbundled retail transmission service pursuant to a state requirement.
Section 212(h) of the FPA prohibits the Commission from ordering retail
transmission directly to an ultimate consumer. However, under Order 888,
if unbundled interstate retail wheeling occurs, the Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction over the rates, terms and conditions of the unbundled
retail transmission. Tariffs for such service must be filed at the Commission.
The Commission's position on this jurisdictional issue has been very
controversial with State commissions.
The Commission concluded in Order 888 that as a general matter, it
expects unbundled retail transmission service to be taken under the same
tariff as that used for wholesale customers. A State commission may,
however, seek waivers of certain wholesale tariff provisions or may seek a
separate retail tariff necessary to meet local concerns. The Commission also
stated that it would give deference to State commissions on where to draw
the line between Commission-jurisdictional transmission facilities and Statejurisdictional local distribution facilities. Such jurisdictional line drawing
should be based on seven technical indicators enumerated.in the rule, as
well as on other technical factors a State believes are appropriate. The
Commission will defer to State commission recommendations regarding not
only the correct classification of facilities as transmission or local
distribution, but also the appropriate cost allocations for such facilities.
Thus far, the Commission has accepted retail service filings for
utilities participating in State retail pilot programs in Illinois, New
Hampshire and Massachusetts. In the New Hampshire proceeding, the
Commission announced that it would require retail customers to take
service under the wholesale proforma tariff, but that it would waive some
of the provisions that were not appropriate for retail service such as
customer deposits and service agreement filings.9
The second Order 888 tariff provision that may be particularly
relevant for those considering using open access is the reciprocity provision.
Reciprocity has been a major point of debate in the industry. Order 888 does
not directly require non-public utilities such as municipalities and most
cooperatives to provide open access because the Commission has no

9. New England Power Company, et al., 75 FERC

61,207 (1996).
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authority to do so under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA. 10 However, the
open access pro forma tariffs contain a provision that requires reciprocal
service from any customer that takes transmission service under the tariff.
If a non-public utility takes open access service from a public utility,
the non-public utility and its corporate affiliates must offer comparable
access in return. The non-public utility does not have to have a tariff of
general applicability, but need only offer reciprocal service to the public
utilities from whom it receives open access transmission service. The only
exception is if the non-public utility is a member of a power pool or a
regional transmission group [hereinafter RTG]. If the non-public utility
belongs to a power pool or RTG, it must offer service to all members of the
pool or the RTG.
A non-public utility cannot use an intermediary, such as a marketer,
to avoid the reciprocity provision. If the non-public utility does not want to
provide reciprocal service, it may rely on the voluntary good-will of the
public utility to waive the reciprocity provision in its open access tariff. This
option, however, may not be a very comforting one to many non-public
utilities.
There are three other important points to mention regarding
reciprocity. First, the Commission made clear that transmission will not
have to be provided by a non-public utility if it will result in jeopardizing
the non-public utility's tax-exempt status. Second, the Commission
recognized that many non-public utilities are very willing to provide
reciprocal access, indeed open access to all comers. However, the nonpublic utilities seek a mechanism by which they can get a Commission
determination that the access they are offering meets the Commission's
comparability standards. The Commission has provided a voluntary safe
harbor procedure whereby these utilities may come to the Commission and
obtain such a determination. Third, the Commission may waive the
reciprocity provision for non-public utilities if they provide adequate
justification.
While the Order 888 proforma tariff contains the minimum terms and
conditions of service sufficient to remedy undue discrimination, the
Commission is analyzing whether there may be a type of tariff that would
better ensure non-discrimination and better accommodate competitive
markets. Therefore, in conjunction with the Order 888 proforna tariff, the
Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that proposes to
replace the Order 888 tariff with a capacity reservation tariff [hereinafter
CRT]. Under a CRT, the Commission would drop the concept of network,

10. The Commission's authority to order these entities to provide access is limited to
case-by-case applications under section 211.
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load-based service. Instead, all transmission capacity would be nominated
and reserved on the same basis. All users of the system, including the
transmission owner on behalf of both wholesale and retail native load,
would have to state explicitly up-front how much capacity they want set
aside to meet their needs. If the Commission adopts this type of tariff, it
proposes to have new tariffs filed by December 31, 1997.
In addition to requiring public utilities to file an open access tariff of
general applicability, Order 888 requires public utilities to functionally
unbundle transmission and generation. This means four things. First, a
public utility must take transmission service under its own tariff."' The
utility must take both wholesale and unbundled retail transmission service
under its own tariff. Second, the utility must quote separate rates for
wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services. Third, the utility
must develop an electronic information network that gives other users of its
transmission system the same access to transmission information that the
utility enjoys. The companion Order 889 carries out this requirement by
providing the standards for utilities to implement an open access same-time
information system or OASIS. Finally, the utility must follow a code of
conduct that requires it to separate employees involved in transmission
system operations functions from those involved in wholesale marketing
functions. These details are addressed in Order 889.
The Commission concluded that these four components of functional
unbundling are currently adequate to ensure non-discrimination in the
provision of transmission services. The Commission did not deem it
necessary to require corporate restructuring. However, it will accommodate
voluntary or State-ordered restructuring that is consistent with the
comparability principles of Order 888.
Order 888 encourages, but does not require, operational unbundling
of transmission facilities. Operational unbundling involves new structural
arrangements that separate operation of, and access to, the transmission
grid from the economic interests in generation. An example would be an
independent system operator [hereinafter ISO]. The Commission
particularly encourages ISOs as a method for power pools to remedy undue
discrimination. Because many utilities are voluntarily considering ISOs and
states such as California are requiring them, the rule lists 11 principles
which the Commission will use to analyze ISO proposals.
Importantly, Order 888 does not abrogate existing contracts. If a
customer currently has a requirements contract for bundled generation/
transmission service or a transmission only contract, it will remain under

11. I.e. the utility must apply the same rates, terms and conditions to its own uses of the
system that it applies to others.
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that contract until the contract expires or is modified by the Commission.
A customer cannot simply walk away from an existing contract and start
taking service under the utility's open access tariff in order to reach another
generation supplier. However, if parties executed a power requirements
contract on or before July 11, 1994, the Commission will entertain requests
from either side of the contract (utility or customer) to shorten the contract,
terminate the contract or add a stranded cost provision to the contract. The
Commission will even entertain such requests for certain contracts
containing a "Mobile-Sierra" clause which precludes one or both parties
from seeking contract modifications unless the contract is contrary to the
public interest.
III. ORDER 888 STRANDED COST RECOVERY PROVISIONS
The second major issue covered by Order 888 is stranded cost
recovery. This issue has major consequences for customers seeking to leave
their existing generation supplier's system and for how long it will take to
achieve competition. Stranded cost recovery is perhaps the most critical and
contentious issue in Order 888.
Order 888 makes three fundamental decisions on stranded costs.
First, it permits utilities to seek full recovery of certain stranded costs that
result from access to wholesale transmission services.12 This decision is
based on the policy of not impairing the financial ability of utilities to
continue to provide reliable service and to prevent forcing an excessive
burden on customers remaining on a utility's power supply system who
might otherwise have to bear the stranded costs. It is also based on the
equitable ground of adhering to the regulatory bargain under which utilities
made major capital investments or entered into long-term supply contracts.
Second, the rule determines that stranded costs should be directly assigned
to the customers who caused the costs to be incurred. Lastly, the rule
determines that stranded costs caused by retail wheeling are primarily a
state issue.
What are stranded costs under the final rule? Stranded costs are any
legitimate, prudent and verifiable costs incurred by a utility to provide
power service to a customer that uses the utility's transmission system to
shop for power elsewhere, before paying all the costs that were incurred on
that customer's behalf. Order 888 defines two categories of stranded costs.
The first is wholesale stranded costs. This includes costs incurred on behalf
of an existing wholesale requirements customer or a "retail-turned-

12. This includes both open access tariff services under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA
and services under section 211 of the FPA.
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wholesale" customer' that subsequently becomes an unbundled wholesale
transmission customer of its former power supplier. The second category
is retail stranded costs. These are defined as costs incurred on behalf of a
retail customer that subsequently becomes an unbundled retail transmission
customer of its former power supplier.
, From whom will stranded costs be recovered under the rule? The
rule follows the direct assignment approach which requires that stranded
costs be recovered from the customer that caused the costs to be incurred.
The alternative choices for the Commission here were variations of a
"broad-based" or "spread-the-pain" approach which requires that all
transmission users share in stranded costs or that stranded costs be shared
by utility shareholders and transmission users. Order 888 discusses at
length the pros and cons of direct assignment versus a broad-based
approach.
After carefully considering alternatives, the Commission concluded
that the traditional regulatory concept of cost causation should be followed.
An important consideration in this decision was the fact that in the electric
area, the Commission is able to address the issue up front before customers
leave their existing suppliers' systems. The Commission recognized the
argument that this approach may delay the benefits of competitive markets
for some, but concluded that the delay would be offset by not shifting costs
to other transmission users that had no responsibility for stranding the costs
in the first place. Moreover, the Commission emphasized that the approach
chosen is a transitional mechanism, that in the long run will benefit all
consumers.
There is considerable legal debate on whether stranded cost recovery
is permissible at all, or whether it represents an illegal tying arrangement.
There is also widespread debate on whether the direct assignment is legally
permissible. On July 16,1996, in United DistributionCos. v. FERC,"4 the D.C.
Circuit issued an opinion on the Commission's Order 636 natural gas
restructuring rule"5 that will greatly inform these debates. Read fairly, the
opinion validates the concept of stranded costs and lays to rest concerns
about illegal tying arrangements. The court remanded the Commission's

13. A "retail-turned-wholesale" customer refers to a retail customer that becomes, either
directly or through another wholesale transmission purchaser, an unbundled wholesale
transmission services customer of a public utility or transmitting utility.
14. 88 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
15. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing SelfImplementing Transportation; and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, FERC Stats. & Regs. ' 30,939 (Apr. 8,1992); orderon reh'g, Order No.
636-A, FERC Stats. &Regs. 30,950 (Aug. 3,1992); order on reh'g, Order No. 636-B, 61 FERC
161,272 (Nov. 27,1992), reh'gdenied, 62 FERC 61,007 (Jan. 8,1993).
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decision to exempt gas pipelines from paying a share of gas supply
realignment costs. However, the court did not indicate that the Commission
cannot use a direct assignment approach in the electric area if properly
justified and explained.
Who can come to the Commission for stranded cost recovery and
when can they come? Order 888 allows utilities to seek full recovery of
"certain" stranded costs. However, the order is not a blanket invitation for
recovery of all uneconomic costs. If a public utility sells power to an existing
wholesale customer under a requirements contract executed on or before
July 11, 1994, and the requirements contract does not contain an exit fee or
other explicit stranded cost provision, the utility may seek recovery of
stranded costs associated with that contract. The utility can seek to add an
exit fee or other stranded cost provision to the contract, or it can seek to add
a stranded cost surcharge to the transmission rate of the departing
customer. A utility cannot, however, seek stranded cost recovery associated
with any contract executed, extended or renegotiated for an effective date
after July 11, 1994, unless the contract explicitly provides for recovery. The
utility will have to identify the specific amount of liability or specific
method of calculation. There will be no transmission surcharges for these
stranded costs.
What evidentiary showing must be made in order to recover
stranded costs for pre-July 11, 1994 contracts? The utility will have the
burden of demonstrating that it had a reasonable expectation of continuing
to serve the departing customer beyond the contract term. If the contract
contains a notice provision, there will be a rebuttable presumption of no
reasonable expectation. For retail-turned-wholesale customers, the utility
will also have to meet a reasonable expectation test. Among the factors
considered will be whether the state law awards exclusive service territories
and imposes an obligation to serve.
The vast majority of potential stranded costs are in the retail rate
base and will be caused by retail customers leaving their existing supplier's
system either by becoming a wholesale transmission customer or by
obtaining retail wheeling. Under Order 888, if a public utility is faced with
stranded costs associated with a retail-turned-wholesale customer situation,
the Commission will be the primary forum for entertaining requests for
stranded cost recovery. The utility can seek a stranded cost surcharge to the
transmission rate of the new wholesale transmission customer.
If a public utility is faced with stranded costs associated with retail
wheeling, however, the Commission will entertain a request for stranded
cost recovery, through a surcharge to the unbundled retail transmission
rate, only if the state regulatory authority has no authority under state law,
at the time retail wheeling is required, to address stranded costs. Order 888
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emphasizes that most state commissions have several jurisdictional
mechanisms to address stranded costs and stranded benefits that may result
from retail wheeling. For example, state commissions may allow recovery
through exit fees, surcharges for use of local distribution facilities, or
charges for the service of delivering energy to ultimate consumers.
The Commission's determination to be the primary forum for stranded
costs in the retail-turned-wholesale customer situation has caused
controversy from both a legal and policy perspective. Some argue that the
Commission has no jurisdiction over stranded costs caused by retail-turnedwholesale customers or caused by retail wheeling customers. Others argue
that the Commission has jurisdiction over both and that it must assert
jurisdiction over both.
A close reading of Order 888 indicates a consistent theme of when
the Commission will entertain requests to recover stranded costs. The
Commission will be a forum for recovery where there is a clear nexus
between Commission-ordered transmission access and the exposure to nonrecovery of prudently incurred costs, or where there is no state commission
forum to address the issue. In this latter regard, it should be noted that in
Order 888, the Commission expressed concern that customers and/or
utilities might attempt, through indirect use of open access transmission, to
circumvent the ability of any regulatory to address recovery of stranded
costs. The Commission reserved the right to address such situations on a
case-by-case basis.
Order 888 adopts a "revenues lost" approach for calculating
wholesale, including retail-turned-wholesale, stranded costs. The Order's
approach requires the use of a specified formula for calculating stranded
costs. This formula requires that the competitive market value of the power
be taken into account and that customers be given the option to broker or
market any released capacity and energy. Order 888 also provides an
optional procedure for an existing requirements customer or retail customer
that is contemplating becoming a wholesale customer, to obtain an estimate
of its potential stranded cost liability from its public utility power supplier
prior to leaving the utility's system.
The above discussion provides a thumbnail sketch of what is
contained in Orders 888 and 889. In light of this backdrop, the following are
general observations that should be considered for those considering
various forms of "bypass" of their historical generation suppliers.
Bypass is not a totally new phenomenon and can take many forms.
There is, of course, traditional bypass through self-generation or building
one's own transmission line. There is also a growing possibility of bypass
through retail wheeling ordered by a state commission. Order 888's
stranded cost recovery rules do not apply to stranded costs associated with
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these types of bypass except in limited retail wheeling situations. Stranded
costs that result from these situations are primarily State matters and the
Commission has recently seen state imposed stranded costs in retail
wheeling programs and in the self-generation context.
With regard to bypass caused by the availability of wholesale open
access under Order 888, there are two major constraints on existing
wholesale and retail customers who leave their utilities' systems to shop for
power. First, a customer considering using its historical supplier's
transmission system to reach a new generation alternative may face a
stranded cost surcharge that makes leaving the system uneconomical.
Second, a newly created wholesale customer will not be able to get
transmission access under the new open access tariffs or under a section 211
order if its requested transmission will violate section 212(h) of the FPA.
The Commission has a number of cases pending which raise this issue, and
in July 1996, it acted on two cases which interpreted section 212(h) for the
first time.
IV. FPA SECTION 212(h) AND UTILITY BYPASS CASES
Section 212(h)(1) of the FPA precludes the Commission from issuing
any order under the FPA that requires the transmission of energy directly
to an ultimate consumer (direct retail wheeling)." Section 212(h)(2)
prohibits sham transactions that are intended to evade the ban on direct
retail wheeling. 7 The section 212(h)(2) "sham" prohibition precludes the
Commission from issuing any order under the FPA that is conditioned upon
or requires the transmission of electric energy to, or for the benefit of, an
entity if such electric energy would be sold by that entity directly to an
ultimate consumer, unless certain conditions are met.
First, the entity must fall into one of the following categories. It must
be a Federal power marketing agency, the TVA, a State or any political
subdivision of a State, a corporation or association that has ever received a
loan from the Rural Electrification Administration for purposes of
providing electric service, a person having an obligation arising under State
or local law to provide electric service to the public, or any corporation or
association wholly owned by one of the foregoing. In addition, the entity
seeking transmission must also meet one of two criteria: 1) It was providing
electric service to the ultimate consumer on October 24, 1992, or 2) it would
utilize transmission or distribution facilities that it owns or controls to
deliver all such electric energy to the electric consumer.

16.

16 U.S.C. § 824k(h)(1) (1994).

17.

16 U.S.C. § 824k(h)(2) (1994).
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It is clear in the legislative history of the EPAct that the fundamental
goal of the "sham" prohibition is to preclude a wholesale sale that is
actually a subterfuge intended to circumvent the ban on the Commission's
ability to order retail wheeling directly to an end user. In particular,
Congress was concerned that retail customers would create paper
intermediaries that could obtain wholesale wheeling and thereby pirate
retail customers whom the wheeling utility has a legal obligation to serve.
The EPAct and its legislative history make clear that state law determines
retail marketing areas of electric utilities and that neither the newly
amended sections 211 and 212, nor any other provision of the FPA is to
interfere with this state decision. This is also enforced in section 212(g) of
the FPA, which precludes the Commission from issuing any order that is
inconsistent with State laws governing retail marketing areas."8
In two July 1996 cases, the Commission addressed very different
factual situations which raised the section 212(h) sham transaction issue. In
one case the Commission found that section 212(h) would not be violated.
In the other case, it reached the opposite conclusion.
In the first case, 19 a medical center in Cleveland, Ohio, which had
been a bundled retail power customer of Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Company [hereinafter CEI] for approximately 60 years, decided that it
wanted to switch generation suppliers. Upon termination of its power
supply contract with CEI, the medical center wanted to switch to Cleveland
Public Power of the City of Cleveland [hereinafter City] as its supplier. The
City and CEI had engaged in door-to-door competition for retail customers
since the early 1900s. However, the City was dependent on CEI for
transmission and CEI had a transmission agreement on file with the
Commission under which it provided transmission to the City. In this case,
the City sought service from CEI under the existing transmission agreement
so that it could purchase power from Ohio Power Company [hereinafter
Ohio Power], combine that purchased power with its other resources, and
begin selling power to the medical center. CEI refused to provide the
transmission. While CEI agreed that there was no physical limitation on
providing the service, it nevertheless claimed that the transaction was the
functional equivalent of a retail sale from Ohio Power to the medical center
and that it violated section 212(h).
The Commission disagreed on two grounds. First, it concluded that
section 212(h) does not preclude the Commission from enforcing
contractual commitments on fie with the Commission, including
transmission contractual obligations that it could not otherwise order. The

18.

16 U.S.C. § 824k(g) (1994).

19. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, 76 FERC 1 61,115 (1996), reh'g pending.
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Commission found that the agreement in this case clearly obligated CEI to
provide the requested transmission service. Second, the Commission
concluded that even if section 212(h) applied, the requested service would
not violate the statute. The service would not constitute direct retail
wheeling because the energy would not be transmitted directly to the end
user. Instead, it would travel over the transmission lines of CEI to the City,
then over a 138 kV line owned by the City to the end user. Thus, it would
not violate the first hurdle of section 212(h).
In addition, the service would not violate the second hurdle of
section 212(h) because it would meet the criteria for a non-sham transaction.
The entity requesting service, as a municipal utility, was among those listed
in 212(h)(2). Importantly, it also met the second criterion of 212(h)(2) that
it either was providing service on October 24, 1992, or that it would utilize
transmission or distribution facilities that it owns or controls to deliver all
the electric energy to the consumer. Here, the City owned and controlled a
138 kV transmission line that would deliver all the electric energy to the
medical center.
The second case addressed by the Commission involved the City of
Palm Springs, California. 20Palm Springs filed a request for an order under
section 211 that would require Southern California Edison (Edison) to
provide network transmission services so that Palm Springs could compete
with Edison to service retail customers within the city. The City stated that
it had an electric system which consisted of several cogeneration plants, a
12 kV distribution line and some other facilities. It further stated its
intention to install meters between the distribution facilities of Edison and
the main circuit breaker of each electric consumer in Palm Springs that
elected to receive service from it. The City claimed that by doing this, it
would be re-selling and delivering power to ultimate consumers.
Edison, the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California
[hereinafter California Commission] and numerous intervenors objected,
claiming that the proposed service would violate section 212(h). The
Commission agreed. The Commission concluded that it did not need to
address the many arguments raised because, even assuming that other
statutory hurdles had been overcome, it could not find that Palm Springs
would meet either requirement of 212(h)(2). Even assuming that Palm
Springs was one of the permissible entities identified in the provision, it was
not providing electric service on October 24, 1992 to all of the ultimate
consumers for whom it was seeking transmission of electric energy. Nor
could the Commission conclude that Palm Springs would utilize
transmission or distribution that it owned or controlled to deliver all such

20.

City of Palm Springs, California, 76 FERC
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electric energy to such electric consumer.
The Commission concluded that with the exception of one 12 kV line
owned by Palm Springs, Edison owned all the transmission and distribution
facilities used to deliver power to all end users in Palm Springs. The only
thing that would change under Palm Springs' proposal is that the city
would install duplicate meters. The Commission determined that the
interposition of duplicate meters would not constitute ownership or control
of transmission or distribution facilities that would be used to deliver
energy within the meaning of 212(h)(2). A meter is a measuring and billing
device. The Commission stated that while meters may be part of a power
delivery system, and for purposes of cost classification and jurisdictional
determinations they may be considered distribution facilities, they do not
by themselves, accomplish physical delivery of power. The Commission
concluded that Palm Springs' proposal was the very type of form over
substance situation with which Congress was concerned in enacting section
212(h).
The Commission further stated that in view of the California
Commission's recent restructuring order establishing retail competition in
the state, it was concerned that Palm Springs' proposal could interfere with
state laws governing retail marketing areas in violation of section 212(g).
Further, the proposal appeared to be a means of avoiding the California
competition transition charge for addressing retail stranded costs, a matter
that is primarily a state issue.
These cases are limited to their facts and do not pre-judge other
section 212(h) cases or whether meters may constitute distribution facilities
in other contexts. They also do not reach the extent of facilities that need to
be owned or controlled in order to meet 212(h). However, they represent
two extremes of the types of cases the Commission will be addressing in the
future. The difficult cases are yet to come."
SUMMARY
Orders 888 and 889 have set the stage for the development of
competitive wholesale power markets and addressed the difficult legal and
policy issues associated with the stranded costs that may result from the
transition to competitive power markets. Customers seeking to bypass their
traditional power suppliers in order to benefit from new competitive
opportunities may face stranded cost charges as well as other statutory or
regulatory restrictions. This is true, whether bypass is attempted through
retail access ordered by a state commission or by becoming a retail-turned21.
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wholesale entity seeking wholesale access under Order 888. For example,
the ease of becoming a municipal utility or other wholesale entity will vary
state-by-state. In addition, there are obviously important state and federal
determinations that will have to be made and statutory hurdles to be
overcome, such as section 212(h)(2), before widespread retail-turnedwholesale customer bypass can occur.
It is also important to keep an eye on activity in Congress and the
possibility of a Federal retail wheeling mandate that could significantly
change the existing bypass landscape. Several bills have been recently
introduced.' Additionally, as competitive changes and pressures continue
at an astonishing pace, there are other issues that will affect not only bypass
decisions but all electric market participants. Among the most important at
the Commission are transmission pricing, utility merger policy, and
remaining market power issues such as generation dominance and
transmission constraints. Among the most important in Congress, in
addition to potential Federal retail wheeling statutes, are changes in the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. In other words, there is significant
unfinished business to attend to at the Commission and perhaps in the halls
of Congress that will affect competitive opportunities.

22. See, e.g., S. 1526 (introduced Jan. 25,1996), H.R. 3790 (introduced July 11, 1996), H.R.
2929 (introduced Feb. 1, 1996) and H.R. 3782 (introduced July 11, 1996).

